Dynamic Nature of Production Models by Pil, Frits K. & Fujimoto, Takahiro
 
 
 
 
INDUSTRY STUDIES ASSOCATION 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 
 
Lean and Reflective Production: 
The Dynamic Nature of Production Models 
 
By 
 
Frits K. Pil 
University of Pittsburgh 
Pittsburgh, PA 15260 
 
and 
 
Takahiro Fujimoto 
Tokyo University 
Tokyo 113-0033, Japan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2006 
Industry Studies Association 
Working Papers 
 
WP-2006-05 
http://isapapers.pitt.edu/ 
 Toyota and its Toyota (a.k.a. ‘lean’) Production system, and Volvo and its 
‘reflective production’ system are viewed as occupying opposite ends of the spectrum of 
production policies and practices (cf. Womack et al. 1990, Adler and Cole 1993, Sandberg 
1995).  The traditional Toyota Production System (TPS) has worked very well in attaining 
high levels of customer satisfaction -- a result of strong efforts at quality improvement, 
operational efficiency, and manufacturing flexibility to meet the demands of a highly 
competitive and diversified product market (cf. Ohno 1988, Womack et al. 1990, Fujimoto 
1999, Pil and Macduffie 1999, Liker 2004).  It placed less emphasis on employee 
satisfaction, the humanization of work, and the attractiveness of manufacturing jobs. 
Indeed, some suggest TPS attained superior organizational performance at the expense of 
employee well-being (cf. Fucini and Fucini 1990, Babson 1993).  The Volvo reflective 
production model on the other hand, has aimed to enhance worker satisfaction and 
involvement (Ellegard et al. 1992, Berggren 1993, Sandberg 1995), some argue at the 
expense of organizational performance (cf. Adler and Cole 1993).   
The tension between organizational performance and employee well-being 
contradicts the original conceptualization of these production models.  In the case of 
Toyota, Sugimoro et al. noted that a key tenet of TPS is respect for humans, which includes 
‘1) elimination of waste movements by workers; 2) consideration for workers’ safety; and 
3) self display of workers’ capabilities by entrusting them with greater responsibility and 
authority’ (1977, p557)   Gyllenhammar, the Volvo CEO who initiated the original 
reflective production efforts, argued it was critical that ‘work tasks become more 
meaningful and at the same time, ensuring that production becomes more efficient.’ (cited 
in Jonsson et al. 2004, p754). As we will show, significant external pressures have led both 
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Volvo and Toyota to reassess their production models with respect to organizational and 
employee outcomes, and search for a better balance between the two.  
The last 15 years have seen growing international competition, increasingly 
demanding customers, shortening product life cycles, and extensive product proliferation 
(Holweg and Pil 2004).  In the early 1990s, firms were also challenged on the labor front: 
labor shortages, union pressure regarding working conditions, demographic changes, and 
the shifting employment preferences of the young away from manufacturing.  Against this 
backdrop, this paper compares the evolution in assembly models of Toyota and Volvo 
during the 1990s and into this century.  The study is empirical and exploratory, but we 
believe the findings will facilitate renewed investigation of the multi-faceted and dynamic 
characteristics of production models that better satisfy both customers and employees.   
We start with a brief overview of Toyota and Volvo’s models as ‘ideal types’ as 
portrayed in the literature.  Drawing on 12 full days of interviews and plant visits at Toyota 
and 11 days of interviews and plant visits at Volvo that we undertook over the last decade, 
we show that the production systems as enacted by Toyota and Volvo have undergone 
dramatic evolution, resulting in convergence in organizational structure, work design, and 
to a lesser extent, technology.  
Toyota Production System – overview: 
TPS, with its origins in the post-war history of the Japanese automobile producer 
consists of several intertwined practices that drive superior performance.  These include 
Just-in-Time delivery of parts, Jidoka (the practice of stopping the line when defects are 
uncovered), Total Quality Control, and continuous improvement activities (Kaizen).  Other 
elements include inventory reduction via Kanban; leveling of production volume and 
product mix (heijunka); reduction of ‘muda’ (non-value-adding activities), ‘mura’ (uneven 
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pace of production) and ‘muri’ (excessive workload); production plans based on dealers' 
order volume (genryo seisan), on-the-spot inspection by direct workers (tsukurikomi); 
fool-proof prevention of defects (poka-yoke); real-time feedback of production troubles 
(andon); assembly line stop cord; emphasis on cleanliness, order, and discipline on the 
shop floor (5-S); quality control circles;  standardized tools for quality improvement; 
worker involvement in preventive maintenance; reduction of process steps to save 
equipment, and so on.  Spear and Bowen (1999), distill these practices into what they term 
the ‘DNA’ of the Toyota production system.  Specifically, they highlight how many of 
Toyota’s practices center on hypothesis testing – the importance of the specification of 
content, sequence, timing, and outcomes for testing new ways of performing work.  The 
coupling of documentation and its associated control, with testing and experimentation 
leads to what Adler and Borys (1996) term ‘enabling bureaucracy’ where formalization is 
an enabler rather than a source of coercion and compliance.   
 An array of HR practices supports TPS and is integral to its success (Pil and 
MacDuffie 1999).  This includes stable employment of a core workforce; extensive 
training and development; internal promotion to supervisor; cooperative relationships with 
labor unions; pay for performance; and team based work.   However, until recently, 
“respect” for employees was as much a by-product of TPS’s pursuit of higher productivity 
and quality as it was an end in itself. 
Toyota’s basic manufacturing capabilities were fairly well articulated in the late 
1970s.  However, labor and product market demands brought pressure for change. 
 (1) Employment demands: A combination of structural and cyclical changes in 
Japan's labor market, made it increasingly difficult to hire and keep automotive production 
workers in the early 1990s.  On the labor supply side, companies were faced with a rapidly 
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aging workforce.  Younger workers increasingly sought jobs in other sectors of the 
economy, viewing manufacturing as ‘3-D’ (dirty, demanding and dangerous).  The 
expansion of Japan’s automobile production peaked in 1990 (at 13.5 million units), placing 
strain on the demand side for labor.  Faced with a severe labor shortage in 1990 and 1991, 
Toyota’s union and management set in motion systematic efforts to enhance the 
attractiveness of assembly work.  While a subsequent recession eliminated the labor 
shortage, these efforts continued.    
 (2) Product market demands: The ‘bubble economy’ era in the late 1980s was the 
final stage of 40 years of continuous growth in Japan's domestic automobile production.  In 
the early 1990s the bubble burst and Japanese automotive production plummeted 25% 
from 1990 to 1995 with Toyota's sales dropping from 5.4 million units to 4.8 million units.  
Faced with lower demand, Toyota turned to enhanced responsiveness and flexibility to 
make itself robust to the fluctuating demand patterns, shortened product life cycles, and 
increased variety levels that are typical in matured auto markets (Pil and Holweg 2004).  At 
a fundamental level, Toyota recognized that emphasis on level production in the factories, 
needed to be tempered with the real demand / pull of customers.     
(3) Changes in strategic priority: The Japanese automakers enjoyed abundant cash 
flow in the late 1980s thanks to the bubble era. The companies also believed capital 
investments could be made at negligible cost by issuing convertible bonds when stock 
prices were soaring.  Many auto manufacturers viewed massive capital investments as a 
solution to labor concerns.  With the stock market collapse in the early 1990s, problems of 
cash flow shortages surfaced, and companies were forced to evaluate capital spending 
much more conservatively.  Toyota faced these challenges from a position of strength that 
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permitted it to take the time and effort to re-evaluate its priorities and meet the 
environmental shifts independently, without recourse to a foreign partner. 
Reflective production system -- overview 
 Volvo’s first efforts at work redesign date back to the Kalmar assembly factory 
which opened in 1974.   Vehicles in that plant were assembled in a cross between assembly 
lines and docking stations, with work cycles of 15-40 minutes per worker (Sandberg T. 
1995).  The vehicles were constructed by about 20 teams, with each team responsible for 
four to five stations.  Some sub-assemblies were also constructed off the main line in more 
of a craft format by teams of workers.  
 In the mid-1980s, Volvo decided to build a new factory, and sought ideas on how to 
further enhance the attractiveness of assembly work.  It wanted to design a plant that could 
effectively use workers representing all ages and both genders, including at least ¼ over 
age 45.  In the resulting Uddevalla factory, teams of 8 to 12 built up complete vehicles in 
cycle times of two hours. 
Both Kalmar and Uddevalla represent reflective production in its purest form 
(Ellegard et al. 1992, Berggren 1993, Sandberg 1995).  However, key elements were also 
found in high volume Volvo plants at Torslanda (Sweden) and Gent (Belgium).  Volvo’s 
reflective production model is characterized by parallel work flow (and in the case of 
Uddevalla, no line at all), the professionalization of workers, low levels of multi-functional 
automation, naturally grouped assembly work, ergonomically sound production tasks, and 
flexible production levels.  These are supported by long cycle times, special parts-delivery 
and order systems, self-managed team based activities, and extensive on-the-job training.  
Like at Toyota, labor and product market demands brought pressures for change. 
 
 6
(1) Employment demands: One of the driving factors for reflective production was 
a labor shortage coupled with extremely high levels of unplanned absenteeism.  Reflective 
production provided conditions more amenable to individuals with diverse backgrounds 
and talents, and opportunities for worker development and self-actualization.  It was hoped 
this would make production work more attractive.  However, in the early 1990s, new 
legislation in Sweden resulted in a dramatic reduction in sick days.  Unemployment rates 
rose from 2% in 1988-1990 to a record 18.2% in 1993.  The labor market imperatives 
leading to reflective production were no longer present.   
 (2) Product market demands: In the late 1980s, there was tremendous demand for 
Volvo products.  Volvo’s production increased from just over 350 000 vehicles per year in 
1983 to 423 000 in 1987.  However, by 1991, when Uddevalla opened, worldwide 
competition in the near-luxury segment had escalated, and Volvo's production fell to 273 
500 vehicles.  This resulted in a board decision on November 1992 to shutter Uddevalla 
and Kalmar, leaving Volvo’s higher volume assembly-line based plants to carry on.  By 
1994, total Volvo production had fallen to 257 000 vehicles per year, forcing the company 
to shift its attention to meeting customer demands.  Volvo decided that focusing on 
enhancing unit revenue was critical as volumes were too low to permit the minimization of 
unit cost.  The outcome was a major emphasis on understanding and meeting shifts in 
customer needs, and ultimately, moving to customer-ordered production.      
 (3) Changes in strategic priority: In the early 1990s, Volvo and Renault announced 
plans to merge their operations.  While the merger did not go through, initial information 
exchange between the two highlighted for Volvo fundamental differences in production 
philosophy and it is believed by some that these drove Volvo management to re-evaluate 
work design (Sandberg 1995).  One unequivocal outcome was greater emphasis on 
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productivity and quality – an emphasis further re-enforced in Volvo’s merger with Ford 
(Van Hootegem et al. 2004).   
The synopses of work practices at Uddevalla often read like a post-mortem 
(Sandberg 1995, Adler and Cole 1994), but there has also been extensive debate on 
Uddevalla’s suitability as a model for future assembly designs (Ellegard et al. 1992, 
Berggren 1993, Adler and Cole 1993, Shimokawa et al. 1997).  A clear way to assess the 
reflective production model more generally is to look at Volvo’s practices today and how 
they have evolved over time*. 
 
New production concepts 
 The production models of Toyota and Volvo have evolved significantly since the 
early 1990s.  The changes are most easily assessed in the assembly area where the 
components are installed on the painted metal body shell.  For Toyota, the evolution in 
thinking was first visible in its new Miyata Plant of Toyota Motor Kyushu Inc. established 
in late 1992 (henceforth Kyushu Plant for simplicity).  The new assembly concept has 
diffused to subsequent plants including the Motomachi RAV4 assembly line (renovated in 
1994), the Toyota Motor Manufacturing #2 line in Kentucky, US (TMM II, new in 1994) 
and from there to the full set of plants.   
In the case of Volvo, innovations and modifications in thinking since the closure of 
the original Uddevalla plant are more diffuse.  We will be focusing primarily on Volvo’s 
                                                          
* Uddevalla reopened in January 1995 under a joint venture between Volvo and Tom Walkenshaw Racing.  
By spring of 1997 the plant was back in operation with 660 employees.  In week 47 when we first visited after 
the re-opening, it produced 125 cars per week.  The layout was similar to what it had been at closure, but 
teams no longer built up the whole vehicle.  These were built up in two main phases, with a third stage for 
processes that were automated.  Volvo eventually dropped TWR as a partner, and eliminated dock vehicle 
build in favor of an assembly line in 2002. Currently the plant is owned by a joint venture between 
Pininfarina and Volvo.  
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two remaining automobile factories: Volvo Torslanda (Sweden), and Volvo Gent 
(Belgium).  We will also draw on insights from several visits we undertook to Volvo 
Uddevalla, both while it was engaged in stationary build, and after it introduced an 
assembly line. Volvo had another facility in the Netherlands until the late 1990s, but that 
facility also produced Mitsubishi products, and was sold.   
We will examine in detail the evolution in production system characteristics that 
historically represented key areas of divergence between Toyota and Volvo and their 
respective emphasis on customer satisfaction and employee satisfaction: Assembly line 
design and related assembly philosophy, team activities and team member roles and skills, 
related HR practices and policies, ergonomics, and automation.  
 
Line work and functionally autonomous processes 
 A primary hallmark of Volvo’s reflective production system was the elimination of 
single flow assembly line work in favor of parallel work in docking stations where cycle 
times are long, and work content and process follows a holistic approach to vehicle 
assembly.  Parts were grouped in relation to their function and position on the vehicle, and 
work was designed to give workers complete control over the production of a sub-system 
or functionally coherent portion of the vehicle.  This was expected to enhance worker 
involvement, skill development, and understanding of and commitment to the work tasks.  
At Toyota in contrast, the emphasis in the 1970s and 1980s was on a Ford-style moving 
assembly line, divided into three main areas: trim, chassis, and final assembly.  There were 
no buffer stocks in the line – a taut system helped enhance productivity, reduce inventory 
carrying costs, and forced problems to surface.  Work tasks were broken down into 
elemental components and distributed across workers to minimize non-value added time in 
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the 1-2 minute cycle times that were the norm.  As a result, many workers were assigned 
mutually unrelated and inherently meaningless sets of tasks in efforts to optimize line 
balance and minimize non-value added activities. 
  While Toyota plants still use an assembly line, line design and use have changed 
dramatically.  Starting with the Toyota Kyushu plant, and at all subsequent renovations at 
other plants, Toyota has subdivided the assembly line into segments (typically 10 or 12).  
Each segment contains 20 workstations, corresponding to a group of about 20 workers 
reporting to one supervisor.  Sets of functionally related assembly tasks are assigned to 
each segment (e.g. piping).  This creates group-level task identity.  Group cohesiveness is 
furthered by a dedicated group meeting area for each subsection, training center, and 
Andon boards showing the group’s performance. Functionally grouping work enhances 
group identity, but also simplifies the trace-back of quality defects to their root cause and 
the rapid feedback loops further enhance identity.  Segments have independent line speed 
control and are linked by a buffer zone where up to five vehicles in process can be stored 
temporarily.  This makes line segments semi-independent, and allows them to experiment 
with line balancing and work allocation without directly impacting the remainder of the 
organization.  This brings back the original Toyota emphasis on ‘respect for humans’ 
‘…where workers are allowed to display in full their capabilities through active 
participation in running and improving their own workshops…’ (Sugimori et al. 1977, 
p554).  At the individual level, line segmentation makes workers more comfortable in 
stopping the line – a practice that had become increasingly uncommon, yet was 
conceptualized as a key driver of worker independence in the original Toyota model.    
 A second fundamental change in work design is ‘parts-complete’ (buhin-kanketsu) 
assembly, where the assembly of a given component needs to be undertaken by a single 
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worker.  This is a major departure from the focus on value-added activity in the 1980s and 
early 1990s, and was a key factor in increased worker satisfaction.  However, the extent of 
parts-complete assembly is still constrained by very short cycle times.     
While there are efforts to create worker identity and provide some degree of group 
autonomy, Toyota continues the emphasis on variability reduction, standard operating 
procedures, and documentation of practice (Adler and Borys 1996, Fujimoto 1999). 
Borrowing from models established decades ago by the American Training Within 
Industry initiative, workers are taught how to participate in developing standard operating 
procedures (Dinero 2005).  
At Volvo in Torslanda, a similarly long assembly line was subdivided to create 12 
segments.  Each segment has two teams and one supervisor.  The idea behind the segments, 
like at Toyota, was to create group cohesion within the supervisory group. Like at Toyota, 
there are several cars between line segments.  While workers have a button they can push 
when they encounter a problem, there is less of a norm of stopping the line if a problem 
occurs.  At Toyota, the line stops in a particular segment if the problem is not resolved in 
the normal cycle time of one-two minutes.  At Torslanda, there was an emphasis to keep 
the line moving: unless a problem is not solved in five minutes, the line does not stop.  In 
Gent, production workers cannot stop the line at all.  While the involvement of team 
leaders and the ability to stop the line is present at Torslanda, there are no group-level 
Andon boards and less group autonomy and control.  As we will see in the next section, 
however, the extensive development efforts and incentives geared at teams as well as 
individuals compensate for the lower emphasis on group autonomy.  Furthermore, while 
tools like Andon boards at Toyota are an effective means to publicly broadcast production 
information and problems to groups, one of their key features is to delineate responsibility.  
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In the case of Volvo, many of the team-related responsibilities provide a direct means for 
the teams to understand their role in problem resolution, and to take on a structured role 
and responsibility to prevent the recurrence of problems.   
The typical working time on the vehicle for production workers on Torslanda’s 
main line is two minutes.  However, there has been a long-standing practice to make 
assembly tasks of individual workers coherent (to have workers install a whole component, 
or do a complete and coherent activity on the vehicle).  However, unlike at Toyota, at 
Volvo Torslanda, some workers follow the vehicle across multiple work stations to 
complete their tasks.  Thus, the main line of Torslanda has parallel work embedded in it 
(multiple workers need to perform the same task if it exceeds the standard cycle time). In 
the original reflective production model, individuals’ work tasks were so extensive that 
problems were idiosyncratic in both character and origin.  Such problems are inherently 
difficult to resolve.  A more scripted approach to parts complete assembly enables the 
company to retain some of the motivational aspects of the original reflective production 
model, but resulting quality issues are more systematic in nature, and root causes are more 
easily traced.    
One of the outcomes of the changes at both Toyota and Volvo is that the pressures 
around both customer responsiveness and employee engagement in process improvement, 
have led the firms to converge on a production framework that is fundamentally novel.  
While they started from a different position, the two firms have converged on a model that 
entails segmented line production, coupled with multiple related task assignment (see 
Table 1).   
Insert Table 1 about here 
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Team work and small group activities 
One of the hallmarks of reflective production is its reliance on teamwork, along 
with extensive individual skill development.  At Volvo’s Uddevalla plant, teams originally 
consisted of 8 to 12 workers who collectively did the assembly of whole vehicles.  There 
were various team roles that were developed.  These included team representative, quality, 
responsibility for tools, and so forth.  Team members rotated through these roles as they 
developed additional skills.  The team structure at Torslanda is very similar to that used at 
Uddevalla in the early 1990s.  Each team has between 10 and 15 members.  Team members 
take on key specialist functions: Maintenance, line balancing, product quality, 
development and training, personnel, team leader...  In conjunction with their supervisors, 
workers request to become a specialist in a particular area (team leaders are elected).  After 
a few weeks of training, workers help their team in the area that they specialized in.  Some 
workers learn more than one specialty, but only perform one within the team.  Not all 
choose to become specialists.  In particular, older workers are reluctant to take on 
additional tasks, and many hold no specialty.   
At the end of the 1990s, Volvo Gent’s annual employee survey suggested 
production workers sought a broader role within the assembly plant.  The factory decided 
to push the team concept a step further.  Specialties vary from team to team and depend on 
the team’s tasks and roles.  All workers have at least one specialty.  Unlike in Torslanda 
where the goal is to have a person with each specialty per team, at Gent, the goal is to 
develop a pair of individuals in each team per specialty to ensure continuity in the presence 
of turnover or absenteeism.  However, Gent adopted Torslanda’s competency management 
system to track skills in its workforce. Training is customized based on discussions 
between team leaders and team members.  Indirect tasks, such as safety, which were once 
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the purview of specialized units are integrated into the team structures.  In the past, 
particularly at Uddevalla, there was quite a bit of rotation within teams as members took 
turns at different specialist functions.  This was viewed as suboptimal from an efficiency 
standpoint.  While team size in Gent and Sweden are similar, the teams in Gent are broken 
down into sub-groups that have about five members who perform systematic rotation.  
Each team is overstaffed by one or two people.  In addition to unscheduled absenteeism, 
these provide relief so that each team member gets at least two hours every other week to 
work on their specialty. 
At Toyota, teams originally consisted of five members and a team leader who was 
appointed by management.  Toyota cut the team leader function in its Japanese factories, 
shifting to a group structure corresponding to the line sub-segments described above. 
These groups collectively take on tasks that would be undertaken by a ‘specialist’ team 
member at Volvo.  For example, at Toyota line-balancing efforts are undertaken as a group.  
However, changes in the standard operating procedures need to be approved from higher 
up.  While process engineering at Volvo develops standard operating procedures, workers 
have more leeway to alter how they perform their tasks, and one of the team members 
specifically works on line balancing.  When changes are proposed from higher up, workers 
have to approve the changes.  The direct involvement of the on-line teams in balancing 
loads is useful in helping the plants manage greater variety and shifts to building to 
customer order†. 
                                                          
†† Some suggest that stationary build permits plants to handle greater variety than a traditional assembly line 
(Jonsson et al. 2004).  This may be technically true, but variety places tremendous demands on worker skill 
development that may be hard to meet in stationary build.  For example, when Uddevalla was building two 
different products in the late 1990s, we found that 20% of stations were only able to handle one product 
because of insufficient worker skill.  Given the six months required for worker skill development, coupled 
with shorter product life cycles, this is a significant issue. 
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There is some debate in the academic literature whether short-cycle times allow 
workers to develop deep skills (Fucini and Fucini 1990, Rinehart et al. 1997).  However, 
others argue that skill development is critical.  As Liker noted, ‘The Toyota way preaches 
that the worker is the most valuable resource – not just a pair of hands taking orders, but an 
analyst and problem solver’ (p145).   De Treville and Antonakis note that while on-line 
skills may be easy to learn, the problem solving and continuous improvement efforts 
require expansion of workforce skill and knowledge (2006).  New at Toyota is a system to 
evaluate and formally certify individual skill levels.  The new skills system, implemented 
in the early 1990s, consists of four levels -- each requiring progressively greater skill and 
seniority.  The goal of systematically tracking and codifying skill was to broaden worker 
skills and create systematic training programs. The work life plans that result give the 
workers a series of goals to meet, and a reward to more senior workers that may not be 
promoted to group leader.  In many ways, this is similar to Volvo’s system of specialties 
that provides workers with a means to grow and broaden their skills and provide them with 
something akin to a career.  It also provides the company with the means to track and 
evaluate where skills reside.  
There is a convergence towards the Toyota conceptualization that worker 
involvement in standardizing work generates enabling bureaucracy (Adler and Borys 
1996).  Workers have ownership and involvement in the process of standardization and are 
given the tools for such involvement.  As observed by de Treville and Antonakis (2006), 
‘responsible autonomy is less related to whether the worker can operate without constraints 
and more related to the degree to which the worker plays an active role in setting the rules 
by which he or she is bound and whether these rules are congruent with the worker’s 
reasoning’ (p110).  The formal skill development and tracking, emphasized at Volvo, and 
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now also at Toyota, ensure that capacity-building for deep engagement with the process of 
variability reduction, and documentation of best practice is routinized.  Group-level 
autonomy and feedback further strengthens and leverages this collective expertise 
distributed in the group.      
Supporting HRM policies   
Both Toyota and Volvo have substantively altered some of their supporting HR 
policies and practices associated with their production models to meet the changes in their 
labor markets and product markets.  We will look at two in detail: working time and 
compensation systems. 
It was extremely difficult in the late 1980s for Volvo to find new workers.  The high 
skill demands on employees made work more interesting but also made it is harder to 
utilize temporary labor in the production process.  The difficulties arising from not being 
able to use temporary workers were amplified as Volvo shifted to building vehicles to 
order (it now builds almost all its product within Europe to order).  Numerical flexibility 
became a necessity and Volvo introduced flextime arrangements at the Gent and Uddevalla 
factories.  At the Uddevalla factory, for example, which built a convertible (sales of which 
are highly season dependent), management could fluctuate working hours by up to 10% 
(185 hours) per year, with a maximum of two hours per day.  At the end of each year, the 
balance was checked and any excess hours worked had to be paid in cash.  Overtime 
deficits had to be settled in four years.  While the hours banks provide significant 
flexibility, it was not enough for Volvo Gent which had to rely upon temporary workers to 
manage new product introductions in 2004 (Van Hootegem et al. 2004).    
Toyota too started with a desire to secure a stable workforce, and switched to a 
continuous two-shift system.  The system, in which day shift and night shift are conducted 
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back to back so that the second shift ends at midnight, was introduced in Toyota's assembly 
plants in 1995‡.  Moving to the continuous two shift enabled female workers to work the 
shifts on a rotation basis (midnight work by female workers is banned by law), and made 
assembly work more friendly to aged workers.  While this provided Toyota with greater 
flexibility in meeting the employment shortages on the hiring side, it radically reduced 
flexibility to expand production through overtime because the shifts run back to back.  
Toyota believes it may have given up too much flexibility and has shifted to an extensive 
use of temporary workers.  In some factories a third of the production workforce in the 
assembly area has temporary status.  This makes job rotation harder.  Furthermore, because 
temporary workers often have lower skill, Toyota has had to re-introduce quality gates in 
some of its assembly processes. 
 
 In an effort to improve product quality, Volvo in Sweden introduced a bonus 
system of 15 Swedish crowns (~2 US$) per hour based on individual, team, and plant 
performance.  All individuals are responsible for their quality, and place a personal stamp 
on a manifest indicating what operations they performed.  If quality problems are found, 
they lose the individual portion of the bonus pay.  The Gent plant has resisted the shift to 
pay for performance on the basis that workers should be doing all they can to ensure top 
quality and productivity.  The threat of being an overseas location of the parent company 
leads workers to believe their continued employment depends in part on exceeding 
Swedish performance. 
 Toyota too has altered its compensation system – away from bonuses.  In the 1980s, 
productivity levels were extremely important and individuals and groups were evaluated 
                                                          
‡  The Toyota Kyushu Miyata plant adopted this shift pattern from its inception.   
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based on their performance relative to engineering targets (called the coefficient of 
production remuneration or CPR).  However, this engendered a lot of employee 
dissatisfaction.  One of the first changes for Toyota was to develop goals based on actual 
data gathered three months after product launch, rather than projections (Shimizu 1995).  
Data is now pooled across multiple plants, permitting more systematic comparisons and 
learning.  The importance of productivity in the payment system has been reduced to a 
third of its original level, and was replaced by a system that ties a bonus into cost, quality, 
and safety metrics. 
 
Ergonomics and work environment 
The overall ambiance at Uddevalla in terms of lighting and noise levels is 
dramatically lower than at any other assembly plant we have visited, and its stunning 
seaside location is hard to beat.  However, there have been dramatic efforts to improve the 
general work environment at Volvo Torslanda as well – particularly on the noise and 
lighting front.  At Toyota, general work environment traditionally has not been an 
important consideration.  However, in efforts to enhance the appeal of manufacturing jobs 
to potential employees who like the work environment associated with the service sector, 
Toyota felt a need to invest significant resources to enhance the ambiance of its factories. 
Toyota's Kyushu factory is a beautiful facility striving for ‘harmony between people, 
society, and nature’.  The buildings, located on a plateau overlooking the harbor, are 
painted light grey and white tones on the outside, and are surrounded by a large ditch to 
contain vibration and any potentially harmful run-off.  Inside the facility there is 
tremendous effort to contain and reduce noise and vibration, and to enhance the lighting.  
 
 18
These include, for example, the isolation of the foundations of stamping equipment from 
the rest of the factory floor, low-noise power tools, and low-noise roller-friction conveyors. 
As important as the overall work environment are the ergonomic conditions of the 
assembly work itself.  Volvo has always had strong concern for ergonomic implications of 
work.  One of the drivers of the original efforts at reflective production was enhanced 
ergonomics.  It was believed that if workers had a more varied set of tasks to perform, the 
likelihood of repetitive strain injuries would be dramatically reduced.  At plants like 
Torslanda, which retain a main line, workers rotate jobs approximately every two hours to 
reduce repetitive strain injuries.   Furthermore, there is extensive use of lifter and other 
‘automation assist’ (MacDuffie and Pil 1997) equipment to reduce exertion and the 
likelihood of injury. 
More fundamentally, Volvo was quite early to redesign its overall products and 
production process to improve the overall ergonomic character of assembly worker tasks.  
Thus, it was one of the first companies to completely separate out power train from vehicle 
assembly.  Engines, transmissions, struts, fuel and brake lines, fuel tank, exhaust systems, 
and so forth are all built up on one platform, and then are lifted up into the vehicle.  This 
eliminates the overhead work that is usually required for these installation activities.   
Toyota did not adopt this practice until the opening of the Toyota Kyushu factory in 1992.   
Volvo’s approach has been to fundamentally alter or redesign whole vehicle 
sub-systems and processes to eradicate ergonomically awkward work, and it involves 
production workers at the design stage to help it this effort (Munck-Ulfsfalt et al. 2003).  
However, it was not until the fall of 1998 that it started to systematically analyze individual 
jobs and associated tasks with the goal of redesigning or re-distributing tasks to enhance 
ergonomics.  Using a system called Ergosam it is classifying all tasks into one of three 
 
 19
categories: ergonomically unsound, ergonomically problematic, and no ergonomic 
problems.  These categories are based on a detailed analysis of movements and loads 
undertaken in the task.  This detailed analysis of workstations matches Toyota’s approach.   
At Toyota, the issue of ergonomics has never had the level of attention that it has 
received at Volvo.  Indeed, Toyota was cited by OSHA for ergonomic problems at its 
NUMMI factory when it introduced a new car model in 1993 (see Adler et al. 1997).   In 
the early 1990s Toyota created a measure known as TVAL (‘Toyota Verification of 
Assembly Line’), to analyze the work load of each assembly job quantitatively (see Niimi 
and Matsudaira 1997 for details).  Based on experiments, Toyota evaluates work posture 
and load, along with task duration at each workstation.  TVAL enables process planners to 
identify physically demanding jobs in an objective manner, prioritize the work stations to 
be improved, and concentrate efforts for improvements where they will have the greatest 
effect.  Changes include low-cost automation assist, height adjustable conveyors, power 
assist devices, and distribution of high-strain tasks.   Job rotation also became more 
common, with a 2-hour rotating pattern becoming the norm at Toyota Kyushu in 1995.  
While Toyota improves the ergonomic character of specific tasks, it does not approach 
Volvo’s long-standing efforts to fundamentally alter production processes and product 
designs to systemically reduce ergonomic loads.   
 
Automation 
 In automobile assembly the trend in the 1980s was to go for complete automation 
of assembly processes where automation made sense for either quality or labor content 
reasons.  However, automating assembly processes is expensive and space intensive, often 
artificially segmenting and breaking the flow of the assembly lines.  A further outcome of 
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large-scale assembly automation is monotonous and meaningless ‘residual work’ (Jurgens 
et al. 1986), and there is little role for direct workers in either the operation or maintenance 
of equipment, or in process improvement (Kawamura et al. 1993).  Toyota used innovative 
alternatives to full automation in an effort to broaden and enhance the work tasks of line 
workers.  In contrast, Volvo focused its efforts on better optimizing the interface between 
traditional equipment and the line worker. 
Starting with its Kyushu factory, Toyota abandoned full automation efforts in 
assembly, focusing instead on ‘in-line mechanical’ automation.   This automation consists 
of equipment and component jig-pallets synchronized with the auto bodies moving on the 
conventional continuous conveyers.  This permits automation zones and manual assembly 
zones to coexist on the same assembly line.  With in-line automation, mechanical methods 
of alignment between auto bodies, jigs, equipment and component are used to the extent 
possible instead of sophisticated methods like vision sensing technologies.  Because 
mechanical methods are less expensive, simpler, and easier to monitor and fix, production 
workers can take over responsibility from maintenance staff.  The equipment is also 
designed to complement rather than substitute for, production workers’ assembly tasks.  
For example, in the case of under-body bolting equipment, a worker sets parts and 
positions bolts, which are then tightened to the proper torque by in-line equipment.   
At Volvo, automated sections are isolated from the main production line and run at 
higher speeds to compensate for breakdowns.  While there have been no major changes in 
the type and location of equipment on the line, there have been significant efforts to 
integrate maintenance tasks into production worker activities.  At Torslanda, this takes the 
form of a team-member specialty.  At the Volvo Gent factory, the changes in the 
relationship between line workers and automation is even more systematic with some 
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maintenance work incorporated into all production worker tasks.  This has lead to a sharp 
reduction in the number of maintenance workers in the plant.   Even more significant are 
changes on the supervisory side where supervisory and technical roles are being combined 
into one.  These new supervisor/technicians in the body shop at Volvo Gent play a 
supervisory role for a smaller group of people and are responsible for the technical aspects 
of the area that group works in.  Thus, effort to expand and amplify the role of workers is 
not limited to production workers, but is extending to the management level.    
 
Insert table 2 about here 
Discussion 
Toyota and Volvo have been used as exemplars for two extremes in production 
choices.  However, their operations no longer reflect those extremes.  Indeed, as shown in 
Table 2, the two companies have converged in their practices and policies on multiple 
fronts.  Important differences do remain.  Volvo continues to have some very long cycle 
operations, and has more experience than Toyota with the concepts of natural learning and 
whole work.  Toyota has more experience in fine-tuning individual tasks and in using 
group activities for that and other purposes.  It has followed Volvo in certifying worker 
skill, but Volvo continues to be the company that places more emphasis on the 
professionalization of the individual.  Volvo further provides structured relief time so 
individual workers can systematically go off-line to engage in their off-line specialties.  
Interestingly, the low unemployment and very high demand for cars that inspired Volvo to 
implement the reflective production model are the same conditions that inspired Toyota in 
the early 1990s to adopt elements of that model.  Changes in those conditions for Volvo – 
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dramatic reductions in demand, and high levels of unemployment, were drivers pushing 
Volvo to move rapidly in the direction of Toyota’s traditional production system§.   
While we have highlighted some of the external elements driving the change, there 
are other pressures we have not discussed.  For example, the shift away from dock-build at 
Volvo is mirrored by a broader shift away from stationary build in the Swedish economy 
more generally (Jonsson et al. 2004).  In Japan, many companies launched innovative 
factories to deal with the labor challenges (for example, Honda Suzuka, Mazda Hofu, and 
Nissan Kyushu).   However, these all placed a great reliance on high automation levels, 
rather than the more integrative approach of balancing traditional performance metrics 
with greater worker engagement and involvement. While we have placed great emphasis 
on environmental pressures, it should be noted that firm specific factors also played very 
important roles.  For example, Ford ownership of Volvo played a role in the greater push 
for manufacturing efficiency (Van Hootegem et al. 2004).  Likewise, at Toyota, the union 
played a critically important role in early 1990 in directing management’s attention to 
worker well-being. 
The reflective production as it was originally envisioned for Kalmar and Uddevalla 
has evolved significantly, and will continue to do so.  Similarly, the Toyota production 
system of today is not that envisioned by Taiichi Ohno and Eiji Toyoda.  Their once 
diametrically opposed customer driven and employee driven systems are converging at the 
level of work practices, operations, and technology, if not theories and principles. As 
various authors have pointed out, it would be tautological to claim that the capabilities of 
                                                          
§ It is not clear whether Toyota consciously imitated key aspects of Volvo’s reflective production model.  
According to some executives we have spoken with, that has not been the case.  Volvo, on the other hand, has 
been learning from TPS, even if sometimes indirectly through participation in industry benchmarking 
activities, and via its joint venture car manufacturing operation with Mitsubishi in the Netherlands.  This 
experience dispelled many of its prejudices about the negative aspects of lean production.   
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organizations are best identified via their performance (Priem and Butler 2001).  Rather, 
the capabilities are reflected in the dynamic evolution in practice that firms undertake when 
faced with increasing pressures from both the product and labor markets. That is not to say 
that performance does not matter.  Toyota, as early as the 1970s was more efficient than US 
plants by a factor of 2 to 1, and almost 3 to 1 in relation to a Swedish factory (Sugimori et 
al. 1977).  While Toyota’s practices have evolved dramatically, from a performance 
standpoint, Toyota continues to gain market share, and exhibits on-going robust financial 
performance (Fujimoto 1999, Spear and Bowen 1999, Shah and Ward 2003).  Volvo too is 
currently a shining light in Ford’s portfolio.  However, in the case of Volvo, there is 
on-going debate as to whether the shift away from dock-based production was a poor 
choice from a performance standpoint.  Indeed, there are academic arguments suggesting 
that parallel flow required less material handling, and resulted in superior quality (Jonsson 
et al. 2004).  Our data collection efforts at Uddevalla suggest a different story.  At 15 hours 
of direct labor to assemble a vehicle after years of experience with the model, the dock 
model as it was used in the second half of the 1990s was not efficient. Furthermore, more 
than 10% of the total factory employee base was involved in picking parts to support the 
team-based build (in addition to direct labor).  By the factory’s own metrics, productivity 
improved by over 20% after the initial introduction of an assembly line, coupled with the 
team-structures, skill distribution, etc., found at Gent and Torslanda.  Quality levels 
initially were similar, but the standard deviation on quality issues was much lower, 
suggesting greater opportunity for improvement.  We conducted employee surveys, both 
before and after the change-over, and found that while workers reported a reduction in 
freedom regarding pace (expected given the line pacing), there was no significant 
reduction in job satisfaction.  This is in line with the observation by de Treville and 
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Antonakis that “the positive impact of a high feedback-responsibility-low choice 
configuration on intrinsic motivation might be greater than a low feedback-responsibility – 
high-choice configuration” (2006, p116).   
The evolution in practice at Volvo has had beneficial outcomes.  There are 
nevertheless parts of that model as originally conceived that could add further value.  For 
example, Medbo describes how material kitting can enhance value-added activities and 
can help workers better understand their work (2003).  Toyota has recently started kitting 
smaller components and sending the kits down the line with the vehicle as it is being 
assembled.  This has reduced non-value added time, and has helped Toyota cope with 
increasing variety.   
Companies, as well as academics, that rely on Toyota and Volvo as template 
organizations for two different production systems will need to recast their thinking to 
encompass the dynamic characteristics of these two ‘model’ companies, and the evolving 
nature of environmental pressures.  The strength of production models lies not in 
understanding how tightly interwoven systems of practices interact in synergistic ways.  
Rather, it rests on the ability to leverage that understanding in a directed manner to identify 
novel changes in practice to meet evolving environmental demands.  In the case of Toyota, 
the novel approaches come together at Toyota Kyushu.  However, many of the elements 
emerged individually at other factories.  For example, the Toyota Motomachi plant 
experimented with parts-complete assembly in the 1980s.  Toyota’s Kentucky facility had 
short line segments from the start.  Similarly, while Volvo Uddevalla is often considered 
the prototype for Volvo’s parallel and reflective production model, many valuable insights 
were garnered at Gent and Torslanda.  The result was new models of skill development and 
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team work that ultimately made their way into Uddevalla in its final existence as a 
Volvo-owned facility.   
As Teece et al., note, a key challenge for studying successful organizations is that 
their dynamic capabilities facilitate a continuous evolution and reconfiguration in 
resources and capabilities as they react to shifting environmental demands (1997).  It has 
been argued that these dynamic capabilities can lead to equifinality in outcomes (cf. 
Eisenhardt and Martin 2000).  We show that in the case of Volvo and Toyota, equifinality 
was the result of convergence in systems rather than the outcome of divergent practices – 
Systems that integrate key benefits from both the reflective and TPS models.  This includes 
developing and leveraging the adaptability, motivation, and unique abilities of workers at 
the individual and group level, while building organizational capacity for responsiveness, 
variability reduction, and innovation.   
Competitive pressures, including the need for flexibility and responsiveness, 
continue to evolve.  Furthermore, Toyota and Volvo are facing a number of new issues 
such as changing relations with suppliers, evolving product architectures, new customer 
value propositions, the role of non-core labor, etc.  We have highlighted the critical 
importance of considering the dynamic character of production models in academic 
research.  However, only time will tell whether the convergence in systems between 
Toyota and Volvo persists, or represents a common way-station as each continues to 
evolve. 
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Table 1: Task assignment and line structure: Volvo – Toyota convergence 
 
 
 Single Task  
Assignment 
Multiple  
Unrelated Task 
Assignment 
Multiple Related 
Task Assignment 
Continuous line Big 3 (1970s) Toyota 1980s 
Most Japanese today 
Some Big 3 plants 
today 
Volvo Torslanda 
early 1990s (along 
with Booth build for 
sub assemblies) 
Segmented Buffered 
Lines 
 Most European today 
Some Big 3 plants 
today 
Toyota Today 
Volvo Today 
Booth Build Pre-Ford 
(assembly gang) 
 Craft System 
Volvo Uddevalla late 
1990s (pre- line) 
Mercedes Ratstatt 
mid 1990s 
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Table 2: Evolution in key parameters of lean and reflective production 
 
 Toyota Original Toyota Revised Volvo Original Volvo Revised  Convergence? 
Assembly 
line 
 
 
 
buffers 
 
 
cycle time 
 
task 
coherence 
 
 
 
andon 
 
 
 
line stop     
Long assembly lines 
broken into three main 
areas   
 
 
No in-process buffers 
 
 
Short (1-2 minute) cycle 
times 
Work tasks based on 
balancing and minimizing 
non-value-added 
 
 
Extensive use of Andon, 
and indicators of plant and 
line performance 
 
Workers can stop line if 
problems occur 
Assembly line broken into multiple 
segments -- correspond to supervisor 
group. Functionally related work 
brought together in each segment 
 
In-line buffers used to create group 
autonomy 
 
Short cycle time 
 
Parts-complete assembly within cycle 
time for individual; move to holistic and 
coherent work at group level 
 
 
Andon, team areas, and info sharing 
continue but are now focused on 
line-segment 
 
Workers can stop line but new use --  
buffer helps absorb impact of / facilitate 
group driven innovation 
Elimination of line in some 
instances, and great emphasis 
on docking stations 
 
 
Buffers develop naturally 
between stations 
 
Long cycle times – up to two 
hours 
Tasks based on notion of 
‘holistic’ work 
 
 
 
No Andon, few standardized 
work processes 
 
 
Workers inherently control 
line speed 
Emphasis on line work.  Supervisor 
groups correspond to line segments. 
Removal of docking stations in most 
areas 
 
In-line buffers exist but rarely used 
to enhance autonomy 
 
Short cycle times except where  
in-line work spans stations 
Parts complete assembly, at 
individual level, even if requires 
more than one station 
 
 
No Andon, worker driven efforts to 
standardize processes and feedback 
direct to group 
 
Workers rarely stop line, but group 
develops and tests process 
improvements  
Yes 
 
 
 
 
Yes - although 
usage differs 
 
Yes 
 
Yes - although 
Volvo goes 
further in notion 
of whole work 
for individual 
Yes - efforts to 
link results 
directly to 
originating team 
Yes - 
convergence on 
group-based 
innovation 
Team 
work 
 
 
 
 
size 
 
 
leader 
 
 
skill  
Team as a whole develops 
expertise in areas like 
quality and line balancing 
 
 
 
Teams have five or six 
members 
 
Team leaders are appointed 
 
 
Egalitarian spirit within 
team 
Team expertise continues, but efforts to 
increase and document individual 
worker skills 
 
 
 
Converted to groups of 15-20 members 
 
 
Team leader role eliminated 
 
 
Skill ranks created, to give workers 
opportunity for documenting skills for 
advancement 
Team members rotate through 
specialist roles such as team 
leader, personnel, 
maintenance 
 
 
Teams have between 10 and 
15 members 
 
Team leaders elected 
 
 
Emphasis on 
professionalization 
Team members each develop own 
specialties.  Two team members per 
specialty. Relief person so team 
members can exercise specialties 
 
 
Team size unchanged but Volvo 
Gent has  sub-groups of five workers 
 
Team leader elected, but in Gent 
appointed 
 
Strong emphasis on recording of 
skills spread through company 
Some - but Volvo 
more emphasis 
on individual 
worker 
development and 
off-line roles 
Yes  
 
 
No - different 
team leader roles 
persist 
Yes  
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 Toyota Old Toyota New Volvo Old Volvo New  Convergence? 
Supporting 
HRM –  
flexibility 
 
 
 
bonuses 
 
 
Flexibility through 
overtime and non-core 
workers 
 
 
 
Bonuses important 
fraction of salary – 
depend on performance 
in relation to theoretic 
performance criteria 
Flexibility reduced because of 
back-to-back shifts.  Greater use of 
women. Dramatic increase in temp. 
workers 
 
 
Bonuses tied to productivity are 1/3 of 
original level – greater emphasis on 
cost, quality, and safety.  Productivity 
assessed in relation to actual 
performance across multiple plants 
Flexibility through 
employment fluctuation and 
overtime, recent use of 
temporary workers 
 
 
Few bonuses.  Salary 
increases tied to skill levels 
Flexibility through flex-time  and 
temporary layoffs to meet demands 
of building vehicles to customer 
order 
 
 
Bonuses tied to individual, team, and 
plant performance.  Great emphasis 
on tracking individual performance. 
Volvo Gent not using bonus system 
Some - great 
emphasis on 
numerical  
employment 
flexibility, but 
attained differently 
Some - less 
emphasis at Toyota, 
but more so at one of 
the Volvo plants 
Ergonomics Not a key concern Great emphasis on measuring 
ergonomic characteristics of individual 
work stations 
Great efforts to design vehicle 
and overall assembly process 
for superior ergonomic 
characteristics 
Continued efforts to improve 
ergonomic characteristics of design.  
Efforts to evaluate individual work 
stations introduced 
Some - efforts to 
evaluate 
systematically 
individual work 
stations new at both, 
but Volvo more 
emphasis on 
product/process 
design 
Automation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maintenance 
Large-scale, ‘complete’ 
automation initiatives; 
stop/go nature of 
automation breaks up 
continuous flow of line 
 
 
Independent 
maintenance 
department 
In-line mechanical automation – 
synchronized to work with conventional 
continuous conveyor. 
Greater use of ‘Automation assist’ 
Line worker tasks integrated with 
automated tasks 
 
Simpler designs permit greater 
assembly worker involvement in 
maintenance 
Large-scale, ‘complete’ 
automation initiatives.   
In docking stations, simple, 
multi-functional equipment 
 
 
 
Independent maintenance 
department 
Large-scale, ‘complete’ automation 
initiatives. 
Greater use of ‘automation assist’ 
 
 
 
 
Maintenance work integrated into 
line-worker tasks.  Maintenance 
de-centralized.   In some areas 
supervisory and technical jobs 
combined into one   
No - divergence on 
types of automation 
used although 
greater use of 
automation assist at 
both 
 
Yes - convergence 
on maintenance 
front, but Volvo has 
gone further in the 
direction of 
integration of 
maintenance and 
direct activities 
 
 
 
 
 
